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State v. Boston, 131 Nev. Adv. Op. 98 (Dec. 31, 2015)1
CRIMINAL LAW: A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BASED ON A NEW LAW

Summary
The Court considers an appeal from a district court order granting a post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, the Court considered whether the holding in
Graham2 applies when an aggregate sentence imposed against a juvenile defender convicted of
more than one nonhomicide offense is the equivalent of a life-without-parole sentence. The
Court held that it does.
Background
In 1983, Andre Boston, who was sixteen years old at the time, was convicted of several
crimes, for which the district court sentenced him to fourteen life sentences with the possibility
of parole, plus a consecutive 92 years in prison. Boston appealed his conviction and the Nevada
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. In 1990, Boston filed a petition for post-conviction relief
pursuant to NRS 177.315. The district court denied the petition without holding an evidentiary
hearing, and the Supreme Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing. In 2011, 21 years after the
Supreme Court issued the remittitur from his direct appeal, Boston filed a pro se post-conviction
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court, claiming that his sentence constituted
cruel and unusual punishment under Graham. The district court denied the petition without
considering Boston’s good cause argument, and Boston appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court
reversed in part, and remanded the case to the district court to consider whether Graham
prohibits aggregate sentences that are the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of
parole and whether Graham provided good cause to excuse the procedural defects. While
Boston’s appeal was pending, the Nevada Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 2673, which
amended NRS 176.025 to prohibit life sentences without the possibility of parole if the offender
was a juvenile at the time he or she committed the crime.4 A.B. 267 also adds a new subsection
to NRS Chapter 213, which makes prisoners eligible for parole after 15 years if their sentences
were for nonhomicide crimes committed while they were juveniles.5 Based on the new law, the
Court issued an Order Directing Supplemental Briefing and Inviting Amicus Briefing.
Subsequently, the State, Boston, and amici filed supplemental briefs.
Discussion
The Court first found that Boston’s petition is procedurally barred unless Boston can
demonstrate a good cause and actual prejudice. But the Court held that the U.S. Supreme Court’s
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Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74 (2010) (The Supreme Court held that a juvenile receiving a life sentence
without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense violates the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment).
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decision in Graham constitutes good cause to overcome the procedural bars, since Graham was
not decided until 2010, and Boston filed his petition within one year of the decision.
Subsequently, the Court held that Graham prohibits aggregate sentences that constitute
life without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense committed by a juvenile. The
Court recognized the fact that courts have been inconsistent in deciding whether the Graham
holding prohibits sentences that in aggregate constitute the functional equivalent of life without
the possibility of parole. The State argued that Graham holding should be read narrowly to apply
solely to a single life sentence without the possibility of parole for a nonhomicide offense. The
Court disagreed, noting that there is nothing in the Graham decision that limits its holding to a
single nonhomicide offense, and that Graham himself did not receive the specific sentence of life
without parole.6
The Supreme Court reasoned that the functional-equivalent approach (prohibits aggregate
sentences that are the functional equivalent of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole)
best addresses the concerns enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court regarding the culpability of
juvenile offenders and the potential growth and maturity of such offenders.
The State further argued that the amendments in A.B. 267 do not include the functionalequivalent approach. The Court disagreed, stating that the plural form of “offense” in NRS 213
as amended by A.B. 2677 shows the Legislature’s intent to allow parole eligibility after 15 years
when a juvenile is convicted of more than one nonhomicide offense and sentences are aggregate.
Conclusion
The Court agreed with the district court’s reasoning that Graham precludes aggregate sentences
that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against
nonhomicide juvenile offenders, but vacated and remanded to the case to the district court to
deny Boston’s petition, since the Legislature has already provided through A.B. 267 all that
Graham requires, which is a meaningful opportunity for Boston to obtain release within his
lifetime.
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Graham received a life sentence in a jurisdiction that abolished its parole system. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 57.
A.B. 267 § 3(1), 78th Leg. (Nev. 2015); Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.12135.

